Regulatory Governance and Financial Stability: A Critical Analysis of Banking Law Reforms in India
Authors: Rajendra
Country: India
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Abstract: This paper examines how India’s banking-law reform trajectory sought to reconstitute regulatory governance, the institutional, procedural, and legal arrangements by which banking is licensed, supervised, disciplined, and resolved, in pursuit of financial stability. The central claim is that post 1991 reforms in India did not merely “liberalize” banking; they attempted to recode the legal foundations of prudential oversight from a directed-credit and fiscally subordinated banking model to one increasingly anchored in risk-sensitive capital norms, classification/provisioning discipline, and specialized enforcement and restructuring mechanisms. This shift is visible in the doctrinal architecture of committee recommendations, most notably the first Narasimham Committee (1991) and the second Narasimham Committee (1998), and in the subsequent layering of statutory and quasi-statutory instruments governing supervision, asset quality, and bank distress.
Keywords: Banking Law Reforms in India; Regulatory Governance; Financial Stability; Prudential Regulation; Narasimham Committee Reforms.
Paper Id: 233003
Published On: 2017-08-11
Published In: Volume 5, Issue 4, July-August 2017
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